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ABSTRACT 
The exponential involvement of China in 
Latin America has triggered a debate about 
the possible consequences of this may have 
on America’s hegemony in the hemisphere. 
Even though China does not seem ready to 
challenge Washington’s primacy in the region, 
its actions are affecting the balance of power. 
From a Neorealist theoretical approach, this 
research evaluates the economic and military 
ties between Beijing and the region, in order 
to answer the question: Is China undermining 
US hegemony in Latin America? It finds that 
China has emerged as an alternative source of 
financing for development projects and in-
frastructure, promoting the image of Beijing 
as a role model in the international arena, and 
hindering, meanwhile, Washington’s exercise 
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RESUMEN
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rio. Aunque China no parece estar lista para 
competir por la hegemonía en la región, sus 
acciones están afectando el balance de poder. 
Desde una postura neo-realista, este ensayo 
revisa los vínculos comerciales y militares en-
tre Beijín y América Latina, con el objetivo de 
responder la pregunta: ¿está China quebran-
tando la hegemonía de ee.uu. en la región? El 
documento demuestra que China ha emergido 
en los últimos años como una fuente alterna de 
financiamiento para proyectos de desarrollo e 
infraestructura y esto ha fortalecido la imagen 
de Beijín como modelo a seguir en el ámbito 
internacional, minando, al mismo tiempo, el 
ejercicio de poder estadounidense. Los vín-
culos militares con los países de la región han 
ayudado a Beijín a fortalecer su posición global 
en términos de distribución de poder, pero 
no se han enfocado en debilitar la hegemonía 
estadounidense en el corto plazo.
Palabras clave: hegemonía, súper poten-
cias, Latinoamérica, relaciones económicas, 
relaciones militares.
Over the last four decades, China has ascen-
ded at a rate that, if it continues, would make 
the country powerful enough to rearrange the 
whole international system. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the United States re-
confirmed its dominant position and status as 
the only superpower, creating a unipolar world 
order (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2017). However, 
the Chinese economy today is the second lar-
gest in the world –measured by GDP- and it is 
expected to overtake the US as the largest eco-
nomy by 2050 (Gray, 2017). Economic power 
translates almost inevitably into military and 
political power. Over the last few years, China 
has been increasing its military spending and 
has modernized its armed forces (sipri, 2016; 
sipri, 2018). In addition, the Asian power has 
shown confidence to challenge the status quo 
in international issues such as the South China 
Sea dispute. China has used its economic and 
military power to build artificial islands and 
expand its military presence in order to gain 
control of the whole zone. During the last 
decade, Beijing has felt confident enough to 
open its first military base abroad, in Djibou-
ti, develop the ‘Go Out’ policy to strengthen 
economic ties with different regions of the 
planet –including Latin America, and even to 
propose ambitious futuristic projects such as 
the Belt and Road Initiative. The hegemonic 
position enjoyed by the US in the unipolar 
world during the nineties and beginning of 
the two-thousands is now under scrutiny. 
China might not be ready to challenge the 
unipolarity of the international order yet, but 
its ascent has stimulated questions about a fu-
ture bipolarity/multipolarity of the system and 
the consequences this may have on different 
regions of the world.
Latin America –LA- is geographically lo-
cated in the closest sphere of US influence and 
this particularity has determined the relations 
between the hegemon, the region, and any for-
eign power throughout history. Even though 
the continent was dominated by European 
powers for centuries, after the wave of indepen-
dence movements, the emergence of the US as 
the regional hegemon eradicated any attempt 
of further European intervention. Washington 
assured its dominance through the Monroe 
Doctrine. LA regained Washington’s strategic 
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attention during the Cold War, when the ussr 
inspired and supported leftist revolutions in 
Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Bolivia, Uru-
guay and Guatemala, among other countries. 
The presence of Moscow in America’s ‘back-
yard’ triggered a wave of interventionism to 
stop the advance of Communism. 
Nevertheless, with the collapse of the 
ussr, the US turned its attention to other areas 
of the globe, particularly the Persian Gulf dur-
ing the conflicts in the nineties. The War on 
Terror made the region almost irrelevant in the 
new world order –with the exception of Co-
lombia and its long-lasting civil war. The US 
faced the threat of non-State actors rather than 
the superpower competition of the 20th cen-
tury and LA was not a natural niche for radical 
Islamism and terrorism. Even though America 
has historically been confident about the bal-
ance of power and its geostrategic advantage, 
Washington has always reacted when a foreign 
power has tried to modify the regional order. 
Beijing’s actions in the region may not be seen 
as an imminent threat to US position; how-
ever, a growing Chinese presence in the region 
in the long-term can undermine Washington’s 
influence, and thus can have consequences in 
the global distribution of power.  
China has been increasing ties with LA in 
recent years. In 2001, President Jiang Zemin 
travelled to Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico. From 2002 
to 2008, President Hu Jintao visited Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Perú. 
In 2012, Wen Jiabao travelled to the region. 
Xi Jinping visited Latin American countries 
in 2014, 2016 and 2018. These high-level 
meetings were accompanied by lower-level 
contacts between diplomatic bodies, corporate 
and business representatives, and cultural and 
academic exchanges. Consequently, China is 
now LA’s second largest trade partner, the main 
source of international public finance and has 
surpassed the US as the main destination for 
its exports (Yen-Pin & Vargas, 2017). Addi-
tionally, the Asian country is now the second 
user of the Panama Canal (He, 2007) and has 
signed long-term agreements for infrastruc-
ture development and exploitation of natural 
resources. Beijing confirmed the intention to 
stay long term in the region with the prom-
ise, made by Xi Jinping at the first ministerial 
forum between China and the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States –
Celac- in 2015, to invest 250 billion dollars 
in LA over the next decade (Rajagopalan cited 
by Yen-Pin & Vargas, 2017). As Washington 
focused on other areas of the planet, Beijing 
built a relationship with LA that it expects to 
preserve and strengthen in the coming years. 
Classic-Realism points out that states 
operate in an anarchical system and thus, 
“political action, itself, (is) inspired by the 
moral principle of national survival” (Morgen-
thau, 1978, p. 11). This theoretical approach 
is based on human rationality that aims to 
maximize gains while minimizing risks. This 
principle drives the foreign policy of a state. 
Accordingly, Hans Morgenthau (1978, p. 8) 
cited Max Weber to explain the permanence 
of this principle, “Interests not ideas dominate 
directly the action of men”.
A set of realist theorists have changed 
the focus from human nature to the structure 
of the international system as the main driving 
principle. For Structural Realists or Neo-realists, 
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the way to guarantee the survival of a state is to 
protect or improve its relative position in the 
international structure. In an anarchic system, 
where no one sits above the great powers and 
there is no guarantee that no one will attack 
another, it is logical for a state to increase its 
relative power and the position in the structure 
to assure its survival (Mearsheimer, 2016). 
In the founding work of Structural Realism, 
Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz 
(1979) argued that “the structure of a system 
changes with changes in the distribution of 
capabilities across the system’s units”. Thus, 
“states may alter their behaviour because of 
the structure they form through interaction 
with other states” (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). If a 
given state feels that the structure is changing 
because a redistribution of the capabilities is 
taking place, it is expected that the state will 
modify its behaviour to protect its position in 
the structure. Power is the means that allows 
the state to modify its behaviour, influence 
other states and the structure as a whole. Waltz 
(1979) highlighted that a state is powerful to 
the extent that its behaviour affects others 
more than others’ behaviours affect its own. 
In consequence, great powers are willing to 
compete for influence in different regions of 
the planet as this could affect the structure in 
their favour. 
The rise of China and the growing ties 
with LA versus the historical relations between 
the US and the region are addressed from the 
Structural Realism theory. As any other region 
in the world, LA has been a field of competi-
tion between the great powers. The colonies in 
the subcontinent were providers of resources 
to finance the competition between European 
powers. With the rise of the US as an industrial 
power, hegemony over the region was central 
to Washington’s security policy. The redistri-
bution of capabilities after WWII created a 
bipolar world where the US and the USSR 
competed for global hegemony that included 
approaches to LA. Although the end of the 
Cold War modified the structure and the US 
emerged as the most powerful state in the 
world in a unipolar order (Brooks & Wohl-
forth, 2017), the fast rise of China over the 
last decades is putting pressure on Washington. 
From Structural Realism, the rise of China will 
mean a redistribution of the capabilities and 
a later modification of the structure. As Waltz 
pointed out, “states may alter their behaviour” 
to influence or respond to the changes of the 
structure (1979, p. 93), it is, therefore, not a 
surprise that Washington responds to Beijing 
and seeks to contain China. 
The growing relations between Beijing 
and LA could be the first signs of a redistribu-
tion of power in the hemisphere. Mearsheimer 
indicates that the rise of China “is likely to be 
the most significant event in world politics 
over the course of the twenty-first century” 
(2014, p. 28), and also points out that “the 
United States is the only regional hegemon 
in modern history” (2014, p. 41). Hence, 
the interaction of these two events provides a 
unique opportunity to explore the impacts of 
a rising power in the region of an incumbent 
hegemon. This document questions if the ac-
tivities of China in the region are undermining 
US hegemony. It finds that Chinese activities 
and links with LA, particularly in economic 
terms, have hindered US exercise of power, 
but that Washington still enjoys a position of 
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priviledge and the region is not decisively in 
favor of  China’s grand strategy. 
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
Mearsheimer (2014, p. 40) states that “a 
hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it 
dominates all the other states in the system” 
and adds that “no other state has the military 
wherewithal to put up a serious fight against 
it”. Additionally, Paz (2012, p. 5) addresses the 
term as “an area where power is exercised at will 
and without interference”. For Paz (2012, p. 
1) a hegemonic challenge takes place when “a 
rising power defies the status quo created and/
or sustained by a hegemonic power, seeking 
peer status or attempting to become the new 
hegemon”. 
However, following the assumption of 
Mearsheimer (2014), that in order to become 
a global hegemon one power must become 
first a regional hegemon in its own region, 
the study assumes that China is not capable of 
overthrowing the US as the regional hegemon 
in LA as Beijing has not reached hegemony in 
its own region. East Asia is the region where 
a fiercer competition between the two powers 
is taking place and although, The Thucydides 
Trap is a latent possibility between a declining 
Washington and a rising Beijing, it is not likely 
that the fight for LA will trigger the first bullet. 
This assumption explains why this research 
aims to discuss how China is undermining 
US hegemony instead of debating if China is 
challenging US hegemony or if there is a power 
transition the region.
According to the definition of hegemony 
adopted, any agreement, link or tie between 
LA and China that interferes with US exercise 
of power, is understood as an obstruction to 
US hegemony. Based on the realist assumption 
of power as a zero sum game, any increase of 
Beijing’s presence in the region would reduce 
US leverage and power in some way. Hence, if 
China continues its expansion, a competition 
for influence in the region can be expected. It is 
commonly agreed that China has been increas-
ing its ties with LA over the last decades, but 
in order to measure the Chinese presence in 
the region, and thus the increase of its relative 
power, two dimensions are considered in this 
essay. First, the economic links, which consid-
ers trade agreements, investment of China in 
the region, share of China in Latin American 
trade, and long-term infrastructure and in-
vestment projects. Second, the military ties 
between Beijing and LA, arms sales, training 
and cooperation agreements, the presence of 
formal military bases, or other types of contacts 
with military purposes. 
THE ECONOMIC PRESENCE OF 
CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA   
From a materialistic view, Keohane defined 
hegemony as “control over capital, markets and 
raw materials” (cited by Urdinez et al., 2016). 
This means that any advance of China in LA in 
terms of economic agreements, stronger trade 
relations or large investment projects would 
undermine Washington’s hegemony in the 
region. According to this approach, if China 
gains greater control of markets, capital or 
raw materials in LA, Beijing will gain relative 
hegemony at the expense of Washington, since 
power is a zero-sum game from a structural 
realist perspective. In this section, Keohane’s 
materialistic approach is complemented with 
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other consequences of the economic involve-
ment of China in the region that could hinder 
America’s hegemony, in order to match the se-
lected definition of hegemony for this research, 
as “an area where power is exercised at will and 
without interference” (Paz, 2012).    
In November 2016, the People’s Republic 
of China issued the second Policy Paper on 
LA and the Caribbean in order to reinforce a 
relationship that has been growing since the 
turn of the millennium. In around twenty 
years, China mutated from an insignificant 
player in the region to one of the most impor-
tant trade and economic partners. The trade 
between LA and the Asian power has skyrock-
eted, rising from $15 billion usd in 2001 to 
$260 billion USD in 2014 (Yu, 2015). China 
has become the main source of international 
public finance for the region and the second 
largest trade partner (Esteban cited by Yen Pin 
& Vargas, 2017). In 2013, China overtook the 
US as the top destination for South American 
exports buying 14% compared to 12% for the 
US (Ray & Gallagher, 2015). Additionally, 
between 2003 and 2016, Chinese companies 
invested over $110 usd billion in LA (Avenda-
no, Melguizo & Miner, 2017). Beijing has also 
reached agreements with different countries in 
the continent to deliver important infrastruc-
ture projects such as a new interoceanic canal 
in Nicaragua or an express railway connecting 
the coasts of Brazil and Peru. In January 2015, 
President Xi Jinping promised to invest $250 
usd billion in the region at the first ministerial 
forum of China and the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States  (Rajagopa-
lan cited by Yen Pin & Vargas, 2017) – the 
China-celac Forum is an international body 
that does not include the United States. The 
economic presence of China in the region is 
becoming increasingly evident and the Asian 
country has become an important player for 
the Latin American states. 
According to some scholars, the economic 
interest of China in LA is driven by the necessi-
ty to secure access to natural resources and raw 
materials and open new markets for Chinese 
manufactured goods (Jenkins, 2012; Pham, 
2010; Hsiang, 2016). LA import and export 
data confirm these hypotheses. According to 
the mit Observatory of Economic Complexity 
(oec), Brazil, Chile, and Peru have become the 
main exporters to China, accounting for 51%, 
21% and 11% of the exports from the region 
respectively. Soy beans, Iron ore and Crude 
Petroleum comprised almost the totality of 
goods imported from Brazil between 2000 
and 2016. Chile mainly exports Copper Ores, 
Copper and Iron Ores. In terms of imports, 
the oec identified Brazil (35%), Chile (20%), 
Argentina and Colombia (11%) as the main 
destination for Chinese goods. The Chinese 
exports to these countries are made up of 
machinery, electronics, and garments. This 
relationship with LA responds to the main ob-
jectives of securing access to resources and raw 
materials, maintaining the level of production, 
and opening markets for Chinese goods and 
sustaining economic and industrial growth.  
This data not only show a relative accom-
plishment of the Chinese objectives of opening 
markets and securing natural resources, but 
also a strengthening of Beijing’s economic 
position in LA vis-à-vis the United States. Ac-
cording to data gathered from the World Bank, 
the wto and the UN in the World Integrated 
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Trade Solution initiative (wits), between 1999 
and 2016, LA reduced its share of US imports 
from 49.43% to 32.71%; while, China in-
creased its participation in the Latin Ameri-
can market in the same period from 1.9% to 
18.41%. China’s quest for natural resources is 
reflected in the growth of LA exports to that 
country, which soared from 0.74% in 1999 
to 9.01% in 2016. However, the US remains 
the main destination accounting for 57.27% 
in 1999 and 46.11% in 2016. In both cases, 
China enjoyed a better situation in 2016 than 
in 1999, while Washington’s economic posi-
tion has weakened. In terms of LA imports, 
China has acquired an important share of the 
market, strengthening its global economic 
position and providing a relative degree of eco-
nomic independence for the Latin American 
countries from Washington.     
The ‘go out’ policy encouraged Chinese 
businesses to invest abroad in order to main-
tain the economic escalation of the country. As 
a consequence, Chinese Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (fdi) soared from less than two percent 
of the global total a decade ago to represent 
more than 10% in 2016 (Avendano, Melguizo 
& Miner, 2017). LA has received a cumulative 
flow of fdi from China of $110 usd billion 
between 2003 and 2016, with $60 billion usd 
destined to Brazil alone (Avendano, Melguizo 
& Miner, 2017). The Chinese fdi in LA has 
also reflected the two main economic goals 
discussed above. However, the last two years 
there has been a shift in the focus. Between 
2013 and 2016, the extractive sector has lost 
importance, falling from 60% to around 40% 
of the total fdi; while the service and alterna-
tive energy sectors gained preponderance, 
rising from 20% to 40% and from less than 
5% to around 10% respectively (Avendano, 
Melguizo & Miner, 2017). According to Av-
endano, Melguizo and Miner, the shift is in 
response to a redesign of the Chinese internal 
and external economy (2017). Beijing is try-
ing to evolve from an industrial economy to a 
more complex market of services and high-tech 
products. Additionally, this is a sign of the ac-
complishment of Beijing’s objective of securing 
raw materials and commodities from LA and 
the construction of new partnerships in sectors 
that had not been explored before. The eco-
nomic relations between the region and China, 
is therefore, reaching a new level of complexity 
and interconnection, indicating that Beijing 
plans to stay in LA in the long-term.       
The evolution of the trade from extrac-
tive industries to different sectors has also 
been reflected in the Chinese participation 
in infrastructure projects in LA. According to 
Yen Pin and Vargas (2017), the neoliberal re-
forms imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund during the nineties have led to fiscal 
adjustments that have negatively impacted 
the investment in infrastructure, and as a 
consequence, LA countries have been willing 
to open the door to Chinese infrastructure 
investments. Consequently, 60% of China’s 
Greenfield fdi1 in LA between 2010 and 2014 
corresponds to the construction sector (Ray & 
Gallagher, 2015). China accounted for 54% 
1 The type of fdi where a new project is started from scratch and thus does not respond to mergers and acquisitions.
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of the total fdi projects in the region in 2013, 
a figure that is distorted by the inclusion of 
the stagnant Nicaragua Canal project, but still 
important when one considers that in 2014 
Chinese Greenfield fdi represented 17% of 
the total fdi projects (Ray & Gallagher, 2015). 
Apart from the Nicaragua Canal, there are 
other important infrastructure projects that 
China has committed itself to delivering. This 
includes a $10 billion usd transoceanic railway 
from the coasts of Brazil to the Pacific coast 
of Peru, that would facilitate the transport of 
Brazilian goods to Asia, a $7.6 billion usd ‘dry 
canal’ through Colombia’s coasts in the Pacific 
and the Atlantic, and a $7.5 billion usd rail-
way in Venezuela (Yen Pin & Vargas, 2017). 
Chinese involvement in LA’s infrastructure 
projects is not only sustained through fdi but 
also through loans and financing. Between 
2010 and 2014, China lent the countries in 
the region $93.7 billion usd, around half of 
it destined to infrastructure projects (Ray & 
Gallagher, 2015). Furthermore, in 2014 China 
accounted for $22.1 billion usd in new loans, 
surpassing the combined loan values of the two 
multilateral traditional lenders of the region, 
the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the World Bank (Ray & Gallagher, 2015).   
If hegemony, as defined by Keohane, is 
the “control over capital, markets and raw 
materials” (cited by Urdinez et al., 2016), 
the growing economic presence of China has 
already undermined Washington’s regional 
hegemony. As described above, during the 
last decades, China has increased its economic 
partner share with the region, has become an 
important source of fdi and one of the most 
prominent providers of international financ-
ing. Beijing has secured access to commodi-
ties and raw materials, and at the same time 
has opened new markets for its manufactured 
and technological goods, accomplishing some 
of the previously established objectives. The 
economic success in the regions has encour-
aged China to promote deals in industries not 
explored before and to participate in ambitious 
long-term infrastructure projects. On the other 
hand, Washington has seen its economic pres-
ence reduced although it remains the most 
important economic partner for most of the 
Latin American countries. LA imports from 
the United States have reduced and the US-
led organizations such as the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank have 
lost importance in the region as China offers 
alternative financing. 
Nevertheless, there are other consequenc-
es of the economic presence of China in the 
region, beyond the mere control of markets 
and goods, which can interfere in the US ex-
ercise of power and thus hinder Washington’s 
hegemony. Beijing has established “strategic 
partnerships” with countries in the regions like 
Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and Argentina (Hsiang, 
2016). These partnerships respond to a quest 
beyond markets and goods. According to Yu, 
the Chinese strategic goal is to create a sphere 
of influence “enhancing its hard and soft power 
in order to elevate China’s status at the systemic 
level” (cited by Hsiang, 2016, p. 59). The 
Nicaragua Canal, the Transoceanic Railway 
from Brazil to Peru and the “Dry Canal” in 
Colombia, share not only the ambition of large 
infrastructure projects, but also the geopolitical 
strategy of reducing the costs of transporting 
goods from Brazil and Argentina to the Pacific 
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Ocean, and more importantly, bypassing the 
US-dominated Panama Canal. If these projects 
are completed, the China-LA cooperation link 
will trigger an important change in the global 
economy, since there will be a stimulation 
of economic development among develop-
ing countries replacing, at the same time, the 
complete reliance on Western countries from 
the past (Swaine cited by Hsiang, 2016). The 
connection between infrastructure projects 
and the Chinese ‘grand strategy’ in the region 
is based on the assumption that Chinese banks 
and companies reflect the geo-economic strat-
egy given the state intervention and owner-
ship (Urdinez et al., 2016). This assumption 
is confirmed by data that reports that 81% of 
the Chinese fdi in LA is performed by State 
Owned Enterprises (Avendano, Melguizo & 
Miner, 2017).     
China’s willingness to finance and pro-
mote important projects for the development of 
the region can also impact Washington’s image 
and prominence within LA. The neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms forced by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund caused some 
unrest in a big part of Latin American society 
that saw small advances in the reduction of pov-
erty and a considerable increase in inequality. 
Unlike the US-led traditional multilateral lend-
ers (like the World Bank or the Inter-American 
Development Bank), China, under the policy 
of non-intervention in domestic affairs, does 
not impose conditions for economic or po-
litical reforms to grant the loans (Avendano, 
Melguizo & Miner, 2017). Moreover, develop-
ing countries in LA and Africa have been able 
to compare Chinese growth and their “own 
stagnate growth while being lectured by the 
International Monetary Fund and patronized 
by aid agencies” (Hsiang, 2016). 
The inspiration in the developing world 
caused by Chinese growth is also sustained by 
the economic struggle in the United States. 
The Nobel-award winning economist, Joseph 
Stiglitz, suggests that “while China moved 
about 500 million out of poverty, America’s 
middle class entered a period of stagnation”; 
this situation makes the US a less attractive 
role model to emulate in the world (cited 
by Hsiang, 2016, p. 47). This perception of 
China as a role model, added to the notion 
of a struggling American middle class and 
the disaffection for multilateral institutions 
of the current world order in the developing 
world and can strengthen Beijing’s leverage 
to reach its goals at the global level. If LA 
countries find in China a partner to stimu-
late their economies and their infrastructure, 
they will be more willing to support China’s 
vision of south-south cooperation and devel-
opment, bypassing the American-led institu-
tions. Without the requirements placed on LA 
countries to carry out democratic or economic 
reforms in order to be granted loans, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the US, as regional hegemon, lose leverage 
in the promotion of values and norms of the 
current international system. Democracy and 
liberal economic reforms will no longer be 
part of the trade for ‘development funds’. In 
that case, China will find friends “extracted 
from US claws” (Urdinez et al., 2016) useful 
for promoting its vision of multipolar world, 
one of the objectives stated in Beijing’s Second 
Policy Paper on LA and the Caribbean. 
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These economic relations have already 
shown some level of international political 
alignment between LA and China. Cheng 
(2006) highlighted how historically the “third-
worldlist” orientation of China contributed 
to a 95% concurrence with LA in the United 
Nations votes. Additionally, Flores-Macías and 
Kreps (2013) found that growing commercial 
ties between China and LA and Africa has been 
translated into convergence of foreign policy. 
Particularly, “the more salient the trade rela-
tionship with China has become for African 
and Latin American economies, the more fre-
quently these countries have voted with China 
on country-specific human rights votes in the 
UN General Assembly”, an important issue 
for China when promoting its vision of world 
order (Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013). Further-
more, the relations have evolved throughout 
the last decades as China increased its presence 
in the region and the US lost strength. Urdinez 
et al. (2016) demonstrated that, between 2003 
and 2014, the investment from Chinese banks 
and state-owned enterprises “has been stronger 
in areas where the US has exerted less hege-
monic influence”. The research argues that 
China “is putting forth a contesting policy by 
actively engaging with pro-Chinese domestic 
constituencies” (Urdinez et al., 2016).
The analysis of Urdinez et al. (2016) 
may suggest that China is occupying a power 
vacuum left by US own incapacity, and thus as 
a consequence of Washington’s own retrench-
ment. However, first, the strategy proved to 
be useful for Beijing as it strengthened the 
‘Anti-American’ governments in the region, 
promoted new forms of international financ-
ing and development and established its own 
presence in LA. Second, the Chinese economic 
relations with Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, 
Peru, among others, could trigger a dialecti-
cal interaction that could push other countries 
historically aligned with Washington, like 
Mexico or Colombia, to China’s side. Third, as 
discussed above, China’s presence undermines 
US hegemony by offering alternative ways to 
finance the development, allowing LA coun-
tries to “minimize penalization in global capital 
markets and Western international financial 
institutions” (Gallagher et al., cited by Urdinez 
et al., 2016) for anti-democratic or anti-liberal 
market reforms. And fourth, the economic fuel 
has brought more countries into the Chinese 
sphere of influence who are willing to support 
Beijing’s vision of a new international order.  
It could be argued that the penetration 
of LA was performed in a period when leftist 
governments emerged in the region, however, 
once the Chinese funds entered the countries 
it became difficult to reject them and China 
remained as an important economic partner 
despite the recent political shifts. With the 
change of government in Argentina, it was 
expected that Macri would drive the country 
back into the US sphere. However, according 
to the oec (2018), China is still a key trade 
partner. Argentina’s exports to China have 
slightly reduced between 2008 and 2017, from 
9.1% to 7.4% of the total. Furthermore, be-
tween 2008 and 2017 the imports from China 
have soared from 13% to 19%, while the im-
ports from the US have reduced from 13% 
to 11%. Additionally, after the G20 Summit 
in Buenos Aires, Macri and Xi Jinping, an-
nounced more than 30 agriculture and invest-
ment deals to strengthen the commercial ties 
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(Henao, 2018). Despite the political disquiet 
in Brazil, by 2017 the country was the main 
destination for Chinese goods and fdi in the 
region, while the effect of the policies of Bol-
sonaro remain to be seen.     
The dynamic of the regional government 
organizations has also reflected how Washing-
ton’s hegemony has been hindered recently. 
When George W. Bush announced the war 
on Iraq, Washington used its economic pre-
eminence to gain the support of LA countries. 
The Central American Free Trade Agreement 
–Cafta- had more geopolitical meaning than 
economic significance for Washington. The 
agreement had an estimated impact of less than 
1% in US economy, while it was much more 
significant for Central American countries 
dependent on the American market (Taeheok, 
2016, p. 234). Nevertheless, US Congress rati-
fied the Cafta in 2005 and received in return 
the support for the war from the six Central 
American countries involved, in addition to 
Colombia, which by that time was receiving 
$600 USD million a year in military aid (Tae-
heok, 2016).
However, the regional environment 
changed rapidly. Washington lost power in 
the traditional regional organizations and 
was excluded from the new organizations cre-
ated. In 2005, the former Minister of Interior 
of Chile, José Miguel Insulza was elected as 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of 
American States. “It was the first time that a 
Secretary-General was elected without be-
ing pre-approved by the US”, moreover, Mr. 
Insulza was elected and occupied the office 
until 2015 (Hsiang, 2016). In 2006 the US 
proposal of a Free Trade Agreement across all 
the continent, known as ftaa, failed because of 
the lack of support by left-ruled LA countries 
(Taeheok, 2016). In 2011, the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States –
Celac- was created. The organization not only 
includes 33 countries and around 600 million 
people, but it also excludes the US and Canada 
and emerges as an alternative to the Organi-
zation of American States (Hsiang, 2016). 
Moreover, it was at the China-Celac forum in 
2015 that Xi Jinping promised to invest $250 
billion usd. The new trade agreements in the 
region have also left Washington excluded. The 
Pacific Alliance links the economies of Peru, 
Chile, México and Colombia – the former two 
already have free trade agreements with China. 
In the Pacific Alliance the US and China act 
only as observers. While the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership –tpp–, which emerged as a strategy 
to retain Washington’s economic power in 
South America and the Pacific strengthening 
economic ties with 11 states –including Japan, 
Australia, Singapore, Mexico, Chile among 
others-, mutated into the ctpp after President 
Trump withdrew the US from the agreement. 
CHINA MILITARY POWER IN LATIN AMERICA 
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mear-
sheimer (2014) used the size of the economy 
and the population of a given country as the 
main indicators of potential military might 
and its capability to become a superpower. 
China, as the biggest economy in the world 
– if measured by purchasing power parity-, or 
the second biggest measured by gdp, and as 
the most populous country in the world, has 
acquired both variables and hence, can become 
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a military power and, eventually, a superpower. 
Accordingly, China is currently the second 
military spender in the world, only behind the 
US. In 2017, China spent approximately $228 
billion usd, accounting for a 13% share of 
the world military expenditure (sipri, 2018). 
Additionally, even though Beijing argues that 
it has maintained a constant military budget of 
2% of the gdp, as the Chinese gdp skyrocketed 
during the last decades the military expendi-
ture rose from $11.4 billion usd in 1989 to 
$228 billion usd in 2017 (Sipri, 2016; Sipri, 
2018). China has also stimulated the moderni-
zation of its military force throughout the last 
decades. The country started operating its first 
aircraft carrier in 2012, the fifth generation of 
fighter jets in 2017 and is speeding up moder-
nization of its rocket technology and nuclear 
capabilities. Logically, the strengthening of 
Beijing’s military power has been closely fo-
llowed by Washington. In terms of LA, in the 
2017-2027 Theatre Strategy document, the US 
Southern Command has identified the greater 
presence of China, Russia, and Iran as a ‘stra-
tegic challenge’ (2017). According to the US 
Southern Command (2017), “These global ac-
tors view the region’s economic, political, and 
security landscape as fertile ground through 
which to achieve their respective, long-term 
objectives and to advance interests that may 
be incompatible with ours and those of our 
partners”, adding that “their vision for an al-
ternative international order poses a challenge 
to every nation that values nonaggression, rule 
of law, and respect for human rights”.  
China’s military expansion has somehow 
reached LA. According to Marcella (2012), 
China’s military activity in the region falls 
into five main dimensions: humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, military exchanges, arms sales 
and technology transfer. The first two catego-
ries are composed by individual events in the 
recent past. In 2011, China sent its hospital 
ship ‘Peace Ark’ to Central America and the 
Caribbean. The ship stopped in Cuba, Ja-
maica, Trinidad & Tobago and Costa Rica 
providing medical services to the local people 
and military (Marcella, 2012). Previously, 
in 2004, Beijing contributed with 130 riot 
policemen to the United Nations Minustah 
peacekeeping forces in Haiti. China is now the 
largest provider of peacekeeping forces of the 
five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, and the deployment became the first 
Chinese uniformed formation to serve in the 
Western hemisphere and was maintained until 
the earthquake in 2010 (Marcella, 2012). Both 
events show Beijing’s willingness to operate in 
the region and strengthen its soft power. The 
deployment of the ‘Peace Ark’ was a textbook 
example of using a military instrument in a 
non-military manner (Watson, 2013). A mili-
tary vessel with a Chinese flag sailed around the 
Caribbean, demonstrating Chinese willingness 
to act as a global leader in a region tradition-
ally unwelcome to foreign powers because of 
the Monroe Doctrine nature (Watson, 2013). 
Nevertheless, these were isolated events, peace-
ful in nature, which did not aim to directly 
harm US hegemony.
According to Paz (2012), based on the his-
torical cases of Nazi Germany and the USSR in 
LA, when arms and weapons systems become 
an important portion of the trade, the threat 
perception of a hegemonic challenge in the 
United States gains importance. Therefore, the 
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increase of Chinese arms sales in LA during the 
last decade is likely to raise more concerns in 
Washington than the humanitarian and peace-
keeping missions. The proliferation of leftist 
governments in the region, led by figures such 
as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador, the Kirchner family in Argentina and 
Evo Morales in Bolivia, facilitated a more fluid 
relationship with Beijing. Indeed, the most 
important Chinese military sales in the region 
took place while these presidents were in office. 
Between 2005 and 2012, China reached im-
portant deals such as the sale of K-8 Karakorum 
fighter jets to Venezuela and Bolivia, air search 
radars to Ecuador and Venezuela, surface to air 
missiles to Peru, among other less sophisticated 
equipment to Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico 
and Guyana (Marcella, 2012; Ellis, 2012). 
Other negotiated deals failed because of tech-
nical uncertainties or political decisions. The 
cancelation of a purchase of 5 armoured tanks 
by Peru, arguing difficulties with the engine 
supply for the engines of the vehicles, and the 
doubts that the Colombian army has, in terms 
of maintenance and technical support, for 
Chinese military products (Ellis, 2012) are ex-
amples of the former. The latter is exemplified 
by the announced intention to purchase around 
$1 billion usd in Chinese weapons, including 
armoured personnel carriers, patrol vessels and 
fighter jets, by Argentinian President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner in 2015 (Nixon, 2016), 
reversed by the new President Mauricio Macri, 
that instead reached an arms sales deal with the 
US, in 2017, the biggest since the Malvinas/
Falklands war.             
Even though the arms sales are a catalyser 
of distrust between competing superpowers, 
the deals between China and LA are not signifi-
cant for Washington and are not enough to in-
crease the perception of threat. In 2009, Frank 
Mora, deputy assistant Secretary of Defence 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, stated that 
China’s arms sales and technology transfers are 
standard in the international community and 
that the new equipment can help LA to fight 
drug trafficking (cited by Marcella, 2012). Ad-
ditionally, first, as US weapons systems become 
more specialized and expensive, China appears 
as a natural option for lower-tier weaponry 
more useful to LA needs (Watson, 2014). Sec-
ond, the military budget of the countries in the 
region, with the exception of Brazil, is small and 
austere (Marcella, 2012). Third, as the region 
has built its military mainly from deals with 
the Western powers, more complex deals with 
China are difficult as countries are aware of the 
risk of mixing military equipment from differ-
ent sources as it could make maintenance and 
readiness expensive and problematic (Marcella, 
2012; Ellis, 2012). And fourth, the wave of left-
ist governments that facilitated the entrance of 
Chinese military sales is almost over, since Ec-
uador, Argentina, and Brazil have elected right 
governments and Venezuela is submerged in a 
profound social and economic crisis. In fact, 
the Venezuelan and Bolivian decision to buy 
Chinese K-8 fighter jets was shaped in part 
because of the impossibility of buying new 
American fighter jets or replacement parts for 
its American-made fleet, and the pressure that 
the US put on other western countries to block 
similar deals. In the case of Bolivia, for example, 
a specific deal with the Czech Republic was 
blocked (Ellis, 2012; Ellis, 2011).   
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Other elements of the relation between 
LA and China could trigger more distrust 
than the arms sales and the military transfer 
performed so far. In 2008, Venezuela paid 
the Chinese company, Great Wall Industries 
Corporation, $406  million usd to develop 
and launch the satellite ‘Simón Bolivar’. In 
2013, Bolivia contracted the same company to 
develop and launch the satellite Tupac Katari, 
at a cost of $300 million usd, of which the 
Chinese Development Bank financed $295 
million usd (Marcella, 2012). Moreover, 
Brazil and China have worked together on 
developing and launching 3 satellites, with 
more planned for the future (Marcella, 2012). 
The shift in Chinese foreign investment from 
extractive industries to service industries in 
the last few years may also be a matter of 
suspicion. Huawei, which has close ties with 
Chinese intelligence, has expanded its pres-
ence in the region and has built six out of the 
seven 4G mobile phone networks in Brazil 
(Coyer, 2016). According to the fbi, China 
could be using Huawei in America to spy on 
US citizens (Newsweek, 2018), and if that is 
the case, the network in Brazil could be used 
to feed Chinese intelligence of the hemisphere. 
The satellites can be used in the same manner. 
In 2017 China opened a space station in Pata-
gonia, Argentina. Despite the fact that Beijing 
and Buenos Aires claimed that the facility is for 
peaceful purposes and for the exploration of 
space, the project has always been controver-
sial. Argentina ceded part of its territory to a 
facility staffed and controlled by a unit of the 
People’s Liberation Army (Robert Lee, 2016). 
Coincidently, the space station is located at the 
same distance from the equator as Washington 
and contains a 35 meter-diametric parabolic 
antenna; both the location and the antenna 
could be useful for non-civilian purposes like 
intercepting satellite communications or spy-
ing (Robert Lee, 2016).                
Despite the possible military use for the 
satellites and the space station, China’s prefer-
ence for economic relations with the region 
over the military footprint is explained by a 
strategic choice, the recognition of its own cur-
rent incapacity and the US military hegemony 
in LA. The global military presence for China 
is at an embryonic stage. The experience and 
potency that the pla shows in East Asia is not 
reflected at the global level and do not pose 
a threat to the US. Rather than challenging 
the military balance, in LA, China has found 
a learning/training area for its own military. 
The, so far scarce, joint military exercises with 
countries like Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and 
the deployment of the military ship ‘The Peace 
Ark’ offered Beijing an opportunity to, first, 
learn military diplomacy with socially and cul-
turally different countries, and second, work 
with US allies, collect information about the 
way the US engages and operates with allied 
navies (Watson, 2013). 
Additionally, even though the deploy-
ment of the first aircraft carrier in 2012 was 
a demonstration of global aspirations, China 
lacks the majority of the naval and military 
deployments to exercise a global military 
presence (Watson, 2013). Moreover, Beijing 
does not have military bases or administrative 
agreements that allow it to establish a perma-
nent presence in the region (Watson, 2013). 
Without the technical capacity to deploy 
self-sustaining operations and without bases 
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or agreements in LA, China is not currently 
able to use the pla as an important element 
of power. Nevertheless, Beijing might not be 
interested in using the military hard-power to 
engage LA, since it has other strategic priorities 
in Asia, such as the South China Sea, the Tai-
wan Strait, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
more relevant for its rise as a regional hegemon 
in its own region. China is aware of the im-
portance of the Monroe Doctrine and the risk 
of a formal military engagement in the region 
that could upset the US and undermine what 
it has already achieved (Watson, 2013). The 
conservation of the global order that allowed 
China’s rise seems currently more important 
than the resources that LA can provide.    
CONCLUSIONS
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mear-
sheimer (2014) points out that to challenge 
the ruling power at a global level, a given 
rising power first has to become a regional 
hegemon in order to gain the freedom to 
play in other areas of the world. This research 
complements Mearsheimer’s thesis demons-
trating that a rising power can undermine 
other powers’ hegemony without having to 
become a regional hegemon itself. East Asia 
is still a hegemony dispute arena between the 
US, China and second-tier powers like Japan 
and Russia. Nevertheless, without challenging 
the US condition of ruling Superpower, China 
has managed in the last decades to undermine 
Washington’s hegemony in its natural closest 
sphere of influence: Latin America.
-Economic power has been China’s prin-
cipal tool to hinder America’s hegemony. First, 
the economic agreements with the region have 
provided China with raw materials, energy 
sources and new markets for its products to 
sustain the economic growth, challenging, 
meanwhile, America’s prime position as the 
most important trade partner for most of LA 
countries. Second, China has emerged as an al-
ternative source of financing for development 
and infrastructure projects without the reforms 
and requirements of the traditional Western 
multilateral institutions. Chinese economic 
capacity, coupled with the policy of non-in-
tervention in domestic affairs, have motivated 
the countries in the region to deepen their eco-
nomic relations which has been reflected in the 
creation of multilateral institutions such as the 
China-Celac Forum, the failure of America-led 
initiatives like the ftaa, and the exclusion of 
Washington in new organizations such as the 
China-Celac, the Pacific Alliance – in which 
US and China act as observer members, and 
the tpp –the latter by its own choice.
In the military realm, the engagement 
between China and LA has been more lim-
ited. Yet, Beijing has revealed its willingness 
to support regimes unfriendly to Washing-
ton, exemplified by the sale of fighter jets to 
Bolivia and Venezuela after Washington had 
blocked the deals with Western countries. The 
existence and strengthening of these intra-
regional regimes contribute to interfering with 
Washington’s exercise of power. Additionally, 
through the launch of satellites, the expansion 
of information and communication compa-
nies –namely Huawei-, and the construction of 
a space station in Argentina, Beijing improved 
its position in the global military balance of 
power, since all these elements can be used for 
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intelligence gathering and spying purposes in 
an eventual armed conflict. Nevertheless, as 
China has other strategic priorities in its own 
region, and the US remains by far the principal 
military partner and power in LA, the region 
currently does not seem important enough 
for China to trigger a direct military competi-
tion. The military realm has been carried out 
to support the Chinese grand strategy in the 
long term rather than to hinder America’s he-
gemony in the hemisphere in the short term.
Even though most of the theory ap-
proaches Offensive and Defensive Realism 
as mutually exclusive strategies, this research 
shows that China is using both simultaneously 
in LA. The economic penetration of the re-
gion, displacing the US as the main trade part-
ner for some of the countries, securing access 
to energy sources and raw material, financing 
regimes unfriendly to Washington and pro-
moting ambitious infrastructure projects can 
be labelled under the total quest for power of 
the offensive realist theory. However, acknowl-
edging Washington’s military superiority in 
the region and avoiding any military presence 
that can cause discomfort to the US, is also a 
sign of a defensive realist strategy. China has 
been highly offensive in economic terms, but 
smartly defensive in military engagements in 
order to avoid a response from Washington 
that it cannot contain. Accordingly, this study 
suggests that Offensive and Defensive Realism 
can be part of the same grand strategy of a 
superpower and can be applied differently de-
pending on the type of engagement, the region 
and the short and long-term goals.
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz 
(1979) identified a group of dimensions which 
a state has to excel in in order to be top ranked 
in the structure including, the size of popula-
tion and territory, resource endowment, eco-
nomic capability, military strength, political 
stability and competence. In an integral ap-
proximation to power, while a given state has 
to excel in all the list to become a top power 
in the structure, this study suggests that this 
power can be undermined weakening only 
one or two of the capabilities. The economic 
relation between China and LA has been 
enough to affect US exercise of power, with-
out profound military engagement. How a 
rising power uses different tools to impact an 
incumbent hegemon or a declining power is a 
topic that deserves further research.     
The political and diplomatic approaches 
between China and LA must also be consid-
ered as one of the dimensions where China can 
interfere with America’s hegemony. However, 
it is out of the scope of this study and should be 
engaged in further research. In the last decades, 
Costa Rica (2007), Panama in (2016) and 
Dominican Republic (2018) have shifted from 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan to China, 
mainly encouraged by the economic incentives 
of a fluent relation with Beijing. Vis-à-vis the 
United States, the diplomatic recognition of 
either Taipei of Beijing by the countries in LA 
seems a harmless decision for Washington’s 
hegemony. However, the sustained reduction 
of diplomatic allies for Taipei will increase 
Beijing’s confidence to ‘resolve’ the dispute in 
the near future, which could mean a military 
invasion of Taiwan. Additionally, the cultural 
and academic relations with Latin-American 
countries seem to be oriented towards the en-
gagement of the future generation of leaders in 
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the region to promote the notion of China as a 
role model and vital partner for development 
and prosperity. In this context, both the soft 
power engagement and the diplomatic objec-
tives of China in the region do not seem to tar-
get Washington’s hegemony, but to strengthen 
China position and leverage to ascend in the 
global balance of power.
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